The military and Indian democracy by Cohen, Stephen P.
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
ACD IS C 0H :9 .
1985
O C C P A P
AH DI.  ^ I ihrarv
Program in 
Arms Control, Disar
and
International Security
The Military and 
Indian Democracy
Stephen P Cohen 
University of Illinois 
at Urbana-Champaign
May 30, 1985
REVISED DRAFT NOT FOR QUOTATION 
OR CITATION WITHOUT PERMISSION OF THE AUTHOR
Presented to the Conference on India's Democracy 
Princeton University, March 14-16, 1985
Stephen P Cohen is Professor of Political Science at the University of 
Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, and Director of the Comparative Defense Project of 
the Program m  Arms Control, Disarmament, and International Security at the 
University He is on leave (1985-7) as a Member for South Asia, Policy Planning 
Staff, U S Department of State This chapter was completed before he joined 
the Department of State The views and opinions expressed in this chapter are 
Professor Cohen's and do not reflect those of the U S Government
I___Introduction
The military dominate politics in almost half of the "developing" states of 
the world, and m  most of the others it is not far from power [1] Until quite 
recently the armed forces were a major political force in many European nations, 
m  the Leninist states it remains under civilian control, but only because the 
dominant party —  following Lenin's lead —  has militarized itself
India stands as a remarkable exception to the prevalence of military 
dominance, or influence For years, outsiders and Indians have been predicting 
the imminent "takeover" of the Indian army but it is today as far from seizing 
power as it was thirty years ago The Indian army remains an outstanding 
example of an apolitical, professional force almost the model of a 
bureaucratic instrument of state policy This is all the more remarkable when 
the Indian experience is compared with that of Pakistan and Bangladesh, states 
which share not only South Asian culture and geography, but the British military 
tradition [2]
The present, compatible relationship between the military and India's 
democracy did not just happen Nehru, Patel, and other Indian politicians, as 
well as their civilian advisers, had a clear idea of what elements of the 
"British tradition" they wanted to keep and which they wanted to discard Even 
then, there were numerous turning points between 1947 and 1985 where things 
might have taken a different direction the army was successfully transferred 
from British to Indian leadership the officer corps underwent a dramatic change 
in its social base, the army suffered and recovered from a severe and 
humiliating defeat There have been lesser adjustments as well all three 
services have had to run fast merely to keep up with new military technologies, 
the army has again been asked to perform demanding domestic roles (especially
2internal security) and from 1980 onward, India's national security apparatus has 
had to figure out a way to manage a strategic alliance with a major weapons 
supplier that is at the same time an occupying power in a neighboring state
Lesser crises have triggered military intervention in a number of states 
India surprises because the military have not intervened A coup is not likely, 
impending, or inevitable More realistically, one can observe the slow 
expansion of military influence within the Indian political system, although in 
some ways that influence is considerably less than one encounters in several 
industrial democracies, most notably the U S One can also observe the 
militarization of Indian political discourse and the growth of an enormous 
military-industrial-political complex One can also point to the institutional 
anomaly of caste-based units recruited on a "martial races" basis, the great 
social distance between officer and jawan (even though they increasingly come 
from the same class background), and the presence of trappings left over from 
the British raj The most recent challenge to democratic values was the army's 
expanded role in governing Assam and Punjab, in addition to Mizoram and 
Nagaland in 1984 there were at least 40 million Indians living under military 
rule, if not military law, making India one of the world's largest 
military-dominated states —  while it was simultaneously the world's largest 
democracy
These examples suggest several important linkages and the need for a broad 
definition of the term "democracy " As for the former, it is important to 
remember that there are innumerable contacts between the military and the 
broader society which supports and sustains it, and which it is sworn to defend 
The armed forces deal with peasants and presidents, with village caste 
structures and nuclear delivery systems, they manipulate public opinion and they
3are ultra-sensitive to that opinion, they draw their resources from Indian 
society, and they make important technical and cultural contributions to that 
society These are not discrete, watertight activities military intervention 
m  several of India's neighbors was triggered by a variety of strategic, 
political, professional, and social causes, not merely the disobedience or 
ambition of a few generals Similarly, the term "democracy" refers to both a 
process and a category
We must examine the military The question is not merely whether there 
will be a coup, changing India from "democracy" to "military dictatorship" [3] 
Democracy has a participatory dimension, involving elections, change in 
leadership at local and state levels, not merely the national level (under 
Indira Gandhi plebiscitory democracy seemed to be evolving) Democracy also has 
a libertarian dimension is the ordinary citizen free from police harassment, 
unlawful search and seizure are civil rights protected, does one have the 
right to travel, and assemble, and is the press free9 Finally, it has, m  South 
Asia, a dual economic dimension The first can be summed up in Mrs Gandhi's 
phrase, "economic democracy," i e the prospect of a better life The second is 
whether citizens have the material means with which to enter the political 
arena
We do not regard the present role of the Indian military as anomalous, 
although it certainly is unique in many ways It is not an historic accident 
but the product of careful planning It has not been static, but has undergone 
significant structural and doctrinal change What remains an open question is 
whether the pattern of gradual, adaptive change will continue Recent events 
suggest it may not, and highlight the importance of a fresh look at the Indian 
military
4—  The salience of the military's coercive dominance within India has been 
recently dramatized with the breakdown of police and paramilitary forces m  
several states, after a major attempt to insulate the armed forces from civil 
disorder When thousands of Sikh soldiers themselves mutinied after the 
occupation of the Golden Temple, the fragility of the barrier between a unified 
and a disintegrated India —  and the military's vital role in maintaining that 
barrier —  was emphasized as never before since 1947
—  India's external security environment remains unsettled Leaving aside the 
armed stalemate with China and the recent war scare with Pakistan (which 
emanated largely from the Indian side), new problems have arisen with Sri Lanka 
and Bangladesh, and after six years, the Soviet Union has increased military 
activity in that part of South Asia that it occupies
—  Events elsewhere in South Asia suggest vulnerabilities in India's own 
political culture Pakistan and Bangladesh underwent extended spells of martial 
law after 1971 Since India is itself undergoing some of the same stresses that 
led to military rule in both of these states, it is important to note the 
similarities and differences between them, not only for the sake of 
understanding India, but because its neighbors look to India as a model
—  Certain recent events have had a direct and dramatic impact upon the 
military, and may have far reaching consequences It is hard to say which of 
these is most significant the murder of Mrs Gandhi, the mutiny of Sikh 
soldiers, the development of a Khalistan movement, direct military rule m  the 
Punjab, and the continuing arms race with Pakistan A host of minor events and 
trends have taken their toll as well the bypassing of paramilitary forces in 
quelling riots m  Bombay, the dramatic increase in retired unemployed 
servicemen, irregularities in senior promotions, controversy over caste
5recruitment to the army, and a protracted struggle by all three armed services 
to improve the quality and quantity of their weapons in order to implement new, 
offensive military doctrines
While this chapter will touch upon most of these events and problems, our 
central theme and perspective will remain that of the military itself In the 
final analysis, it is the restraint of the armed forces that allows civilian 
control, pluralist politics, and democratic civil liberties to survive, if not 
thrive, in India Our central concern is less how the military defends the 
Indian state from internal and external threats than those mechanisms, values, 
and procedures which have limited its political role, even as it has become 
socially, economically, and culturally more important
We are —  with one exception —  not concerned with the social composition 
or caste structure of the larger military establishment, as this does not bear 
directly upon the political and constitutional role of the armed force The 
important exception is the reduced recruitment of Sikhs, a process which became 
a Sikh grievance and a matter of special concern to some Sikh officers
Finally, because of India's special qualities, certain comparative insights 
may be useful India is a democratic, poor, federal system, it is South Asian 
pluralist, and multi-lingual, it shares in the British imperial and colonial 
traditions, it is surrounded by powerful and sometimes hostile neighbors, as 
well as weak and dependent ones, it could easily acquire a nuclear weapons 
capability and is also, in places, economically and technologically advanced 
The role that its military plays is not exactly comparable to any other state, 
but there are important structural, ideological, economic, and strategic points 
in common with Pakistan, the U S , Bangladesh, China, Israel, and others 
Pakistan has a similar army, but different political context, Israel has a
6similar political system, but a different kind of army, China is the right size 
and economic level, but differs in ideology and political structure We shall 
be attentive to comparisons throughout this chapter not only for purposes of 
explication, but because of the special achievements of India's civil-military 
structure
7II The Indian Officer Corps A Group Biography
Since the future political role of the military is ultimately dependent 
upon the restraint (or intervention) of the officer corps, it is vital that we 
describe that officer corps This task is simplified by the fact that the 
officer corps is itself a formal bureaucracy, and thus slow to change Its 
members have written extensively about the social, bureaucratic, and even 
political problems they face We can also draw inferences about the impact of 
particular major events or trends, basing our analysis upon known consequences 
in other military establishments It is thus possible to treat the Indian 
military as a kind of extended, historical family, in which succeeding 
generations undergo somewhat different experiences while sharing certain key 
familial characteristics Some of these critical historic events are summarized 
in Figure 1
The British Legacy[4]
The present Indian military establishment is led entirely by officers 
recruited and trained in independent India The bulk of them entered after 
1962-3, when the army was almost tripled in size Today the army itself has 
about 35,000 officers They share a number of values and beliefs inherited from 
their British forerunners their perspective is all-Indian, and they view 
affairs m  a national or even subcontinental context, not from a regional 
perspective They also inherit the view that "politics" (in the partisan sense) 
is to be kept out of the mess They feel that the army is the only effective 
force standing between chaos and order —  their frequent involvement in "aid to 
the civil power" operations, whether in the form of disaster relief or riot
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8control regularly drives this lesson home —  as it did for their British 
predecessors But this involvement also led to another lesson India is so 
vast and disorderly a country that the army would find it difficult to manage 
it The British taught, and the Indians learned that the armed forces must 
remain above politics, if possible, lest it be torn apart by sectarian 
differences Yet this belief provides a motive for intervention when the 
military (as they did in Pakistan and Bangladesh) come to believe that their own 
organization is threatened by political rot
The Post-War Army
The Indian army managed the transition from colonial instrument to 
nationalist force with amazing ease Nehru and Patel, as well as the British, 
all agreed that any abrupt change in the structure of the army, its ideology, or 
even its recruitment pattern would lead to political instability They were 
assisted in the process of "democratizing" the Indian army by two important 
facts, first, the serving Indian officers were all very young —  only a few had 
reached brigadier rank —  and posed no threat to the politicians Second, the 
ideologues who wanted to create a truly nationalist force could not press their 
case while the army was barely able to meet its security obligations during 
Partition, in Kashmir, and then in Junagadh and Hyderabad These internal 
"liberation" wars confirmed the nationalist, if not yet democratic pedigree of 
the Indian armed forces
Shortly afterwards, the officer corps underwent a transformation, changing 
the class structure of the military Even though the Punjab continued to 
dominate the officer corps (today Sikhs still constitute about 22/ of the 
officers), the army became less attractive to India's upper classes Pay fell
9behind inflation, service conditions were increasingly difficult (especially 
after 1962), the formal status of the armed forces was sharply reduced, and 
military policy was subordinated to a foreign policy which placed more emphasis 
on diplomacy than force [5]
Bright young Indians from "good" families have stayed away from the 
military, especially the army for years At the elite private schools the first 
preference for graduates (after a college education) has become foreign firms 
and then Indian private firms In their place have come the sons of 
Non-Commissioned Officers (NCO) and Junior Commissioned Officers (JCO) [9]
This trend has eradicated the elitist character of the officer corps, 
especially in the army More precisely, it will be one generation removed from 
the peasantry, as the largest single category of entrant into the NDA and IMA 
are sons of NCOs and JCOs, who have themselves spent several years of service as 
other ranks Very senior officers openly describe the intellectual calibre of 
leadership material attracted to the armed forces (especially the army) as 
"intellectually mediocre "[6]
The decline in the formal status of the Indian Army officer has been fully 
documented m  the military's own journals An analysis by one of India's 
leading soldier-scholars, the then Brigadier S K Sinha, points out that every 
one of the 3,000 Indian Administrative Service (IAS) officers is bound to become 
Commissioner or Collector in twenty years and achieve the statutory status of a 
major-general [7] Compared with the pyramidal structure of the armed forces, 
the IAS and police are rectangular in shape As an army officer will only be 
guaranteed of reaching lieutenant-colonel in twenty-four years, the IAS cadre, 
one tenth the size of the officer corps, had some fifty appointments (now, in
10
1986, one hundred) at secretary-level equitable with the army's sole general 
slot [8]
A follow-up study noted that the situation had actually worsened after the 
1971 war when the Chiefs of the three service staffs were placed below the 
Comptroller and Auditor General and lieutenant generals were placed below the 
chief secretaries of states (even though one might be a corps commander with 
responsibility for the defense of half a dozen states) [9] Further, individual 
states can establish their own warrant of precedence for officers of the rank of 
brigadier and below, some created "ludicrous anomalies" In Tamilnadu, Bihar 
and Orissa a brigadier is now ranked above a deputy commissioner and IAS 
officers with less than 25 years of service, but is below such an officer m  
Rajasthan (in fact, he ranks below an officer with as little as nine years of 
service), and in Rajasthan, Manipur, Mizoram and Nagaland, brigadiers are ranked 
below deputy commissioners
Similar disparities m  pay and pension allowances and in difficult housing 
conditions have contributed to the decline m  status of the military profession 
in India to the point where the subject has become a regular feature of the 
professional military literature Significantly, virtually no such complaints 
are heard from the navy or air force Thus the largest service is the one m  
greatest social decline, and the two armed services that are weakest within the 
government remain the most popular among the general educated elite of India
This military is neither elitist nor ideological, but is officered by 
average talent Officers are increasingly the product of the military culture 
itself, many having been taught entirely in cantonment schools, raised in the 
cantonment atmosphere, and obligated entirely to the military for their 
livelihood and enhanced status from cradle to funeral pyre But, the officer is
11
not isolated from his own society The contemporary officer is keenly aware of 
the personal and institutional corruption which surrounds him, even among the 
political leadership of the state Published reports indicate that this 
corruption has touched the military directly [10] In particular, contact with 
the broader civilian society in the area of recruitment, and in purchases of 
stores and equipment are known for their "opportunity" Young officers who want 
to make money on the side gravitate to recruiting details, where bribes of 
several thousand rupees are not uncommon
There is one important principle involved in this brush with corruption A 
man who resists temptation from this direction, who resists pressures from 
family, caste or friends to bend the rules, and who tries to uphold the highest 
professional standards will feel doubly betrayed by the politician who uses him 
and his men for corrupt goals He will also regard a threat to his service as a
threat to himself, since he is unlikely to have any place to go after
resignation In brief, the military becomes increasingly sensitive to lateral 
pressures from a materialistic society and to pressures from above, when the 
officer corps is both professional and drawn from the lower middle class
Future Generations
All available evidence indicates that the young officers now in the Indian 
army —  the colonels of the year 2000, and the generals of 2010 —  are very much
like their predecessors [11] The lure of private industry has reduced the
status of all but few government-related jobs for the average Indian Very few 
sons of commissioned officers join the army probably not more than 10/, 
according to one study, "today there is no such thing as martial tradition 
Sons who automatically joined the old man's regiment are now plumping for 'civvy
12
street ' The incentive is gone The so-called good families no longer 
consider the armed forces as a last resort for a not very intelligent offspring 
Even he goes to a firm "[12]
This lack of interest in the armed forces by the educated and upper class 
families of India is not without parallel in other countries, including Pakistan 
and the United States It is probably related to the decline m  interest within 
the army in the fighting branches, which had traditionally attracted the best 
and the brightest Now there are severe shortfalls in officer volunteers for 
the infantry and artillery while branches such as the service and ordnance corps 
are oversubscribed [13]
Does this change m  the social composition of the officer corps have 
political implications’ In itself, probably not Those who fear the Indian 
army as the last bastion of an elite upper class need not worry Nor are there 
likely to be direct political consequences of this shift m  social class The 
Pakistan Army underwent a similar transformation after World War II and remains 
politically active The U S military, also saw its social composition alter 
after World War I and transformed after World War II, but remains politically 
inert As we shall discuss below, any change in the political role of the 
Indian armed forces will depend more upon actions of the civilians than the 
armed forces and probably come about through other routes Nevertheless, 
military grievances over pay and status are substantial, and may be contributing
factor to an increased role for the armed forces
13
III The Combat Experiences of the Indian Military
It is important to note the type of armed conflicts that the Indian 
military has engaged in, since this does have some bearing upon its political 
role Figure 2 summarizes these conflicts It shows that the military has been 
almost continuously active since 1947 at every level from police action to 
preparation for nuclear war How has this shaped the relationship between 
India's armed forces and its democratic structure7
The Partition Riots and Internal Conflict
From 1947 onward the Indian military (especially the army) has been 
regularly involved m  the suppression of communal violence and large-scale 
counter-insurgency action The military's involvement in these operations is 
inherently paradoxical On the one hand, it demonstrate the national character 
of the armed forces, the contribution the army makes to the unity and integrity 
of India Yet, the army hates such operations No army can train efficiently 
for conventional war and stand by for not control not only does the latter 
disrupt training cycles and demand different kinds of tactics and doctrine, but 
conflict with Pakistan meant that the army could no longer be permanently 
quartered m  and around India's major cities
Therefore, in the 1950s and 1960s a number of important paramilitary forces 
were created to serve as a buffer between the army and domestic disorder that 
could not be contained by the increasingly corrupt and incompetent police At 
first, these paramilitary forces were welcomed, and some observers thought that 
India had become coup-proofed Indeed, during the critical months of the 
Emergency Indira Gandhi did not have to call upon the military at all, relying 
entirely upon state and central intelligence, police, and paramilitary
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bureaucracies But this step was taken without adequate attention to the root 
cause of the problem of domestic disorder the growth of political corruption 
and the linkage between politicians and the state police forces Indeed, the
police and paramilitary forces were themselves to become one of the chief causes
of internal disorder [14]
The attitude of the Indian military towards the new paramilitary forces was 
decidedly mixed On the one hand there was universal agreement that such forces 
are necessary to insulate the military from direct involvement with communal, 
regional, religious, or other civil disorders On the other hand, the officers
are jealous of these forces Their officers and men receive considerably better
pay than the army, and often a status and authority which they do not deserve 
The military would like to control such forces, or be able to place their own 
officers and men in them on a temporary basis [15]
At its upper levels "aid to the civil power" blends into full-scale 
military operations designed to contain regional dissident movements From the 
mid-fifties onward, the army was called upon to deal with recalcitrant tribal 
groups who were seeking autonomy or independence The army has been 
continuously deployed in Nagaland and Mizoram, m  a counter-insurgency role 
Some of the counter-insurgency literature that it has produced out of the 
Nagaland experience can stand with the best written on the subject [16]
The army has accepted close political supervision of its actions in 
Nagaland and Mizoram and understands the need for restraint The tribal 
struggles do not have the potential (as does Punjab or Kashmir) for rapid 
escalation and they serve the useful purpose of giving various units combat 
experience under controlled circumstances Yet there is a certain chafing with 
political control It is exacerbated when the army must work with police
15
officers of lesser experience, or with paramilitary forces over which it has 
limited or no control In these and related operations the army regards itself 
as an extension of national policy, containing groups which would leave —  or 
destroy —  the Indian state For many Nagas and Mizos, of course, the army is 
seen as an imperial occupation force, which from time to time has resorted to 
extremely brutal tactics Most Indians are oblivious to the scope and operation 
of their own military in these states, although the problem has been raised by 
various international and Indian civil rights groups [17]
"A Communal Riot with Armor”
The three wars between India and Pakistan have had a special quality about 
them In the words of one Indian general, they are more like "communal riots 
with armor," than wars between sovereign states The identities of India (a 
secular state with a large Muslim minority) and Pakistan (an avowedly religious 
state) stand as a challenge to each other, and both are extremely sensitive to 
the domestic politics of the other, especially in communal matters
The Indian armed forces have built up considerable experience and doctrine 
from their wars with Pakistan Until recently, this doctrine was passive and 
reactive, and also reflected a lack of civilian interest m  offensive 
strategies [18] Nehru, of course, was wary of the military and tried to keep it 
as small as possible as long as possible —  his reaction to the expansion of 
Pakistan's armed forces was quite restrained compared with recent subcontinental 
arms "racing "[19] Shastri and Indira Gandhi were also reluctant to contemplate 
offensive strategies Pakistan was also too formidable a foe to attack, 
especially since India had a two-front military problem after 1962 and no
16
civilian (or military) official willing to divert substantial resources from 
developmental projects to the military
Thus, India has never faced a situation against its m a m  enemy, Pakistan, 
where there was a sharp divergence between civilian and military approaches to 
strategy Nor, with one exception, has military action been viewed from an 
ideological perspective The exception —  and it is only partial —  was the 
invasion of East Pakistan, resulting m  the creation of a temporarily democratic 
Bangladesh At the time the army was widely praised as having liberated 
Bangladeshis from military tyranny and furthering the cause of democracy, this 
euphoria was short-lived and there is a general recognition that military power 
is not an effective instrument in creating or even supporting regional 
democracies, as much as India would prefer its neighbors to have compatible 
political systems
Interventions Chinese and Soviet
India's armed forces have also had to cope with external interventions into 
South Asia by China and the Soviet Union Each influenced the military's 
thinking in important ways
The 1962 war and its aftermath showed that the Indian army was professional 
enough to reconstruct itself after a shattering military and moral defeat [20]
It had the full support of the political community and some American, British 
and Soviet assistance, but basically the post-1962 expansion and reform was an 
internal military achievement This successful effort did not obscure two vital 
lessons drawn by most officers
First the 1962 performance of the officer corps itself ranged from mediocre 
to incompetent, with a very few brave (and largely posthumous) exceptions
17
Second, was that the military as a whole had been betrayed by the politicians, 
including Nehru and Krishna Menon This lesson was applied m  1965 when the 
then COAS, J N Chaudhuri, asked for and was granted operational freedom, a 
situation exactly opposite that of 1962, when Nehru, Menon, and senior 
intelligence officers and civil servants controlled the tiniest movement of army 
units The '65 pattern was followed m  modified form in 1971 Once permission 
to attack was given the army was left entirely on its own in the east until the 
Pakistan Army surrendered This time the army played a greater role in the 
peacemaking process and insisted that some territories taken from Pakistan not 
be returned for tactical military reasons
An intervention of current consequence is the Russian occupation of 
Afghanistan [21] The military regard this as an unmitigated disaster from two 
perspectives it has enabled Pakistan to acquire new weapons, and it has raised 
an entirely new set of strategic problems Unlike 1971, when East Pakistan was 
virtually isolated from all important external contacts, a war with Pakistan 
would not mean a free ride for the Indian army The Soviet Union, as a presence 
in South Asia, is both a potential collaborator and a rival to India for the 
role of dominant South Asian power
Nuclear War
Finally, the Indian military has at least a theoretical interest in nuclear 
war The subject was included in the army's Staff College syllabus as early as 
the mid-fifties, but only when an Indian weapon became a distinct possibility 
(by the late sixties) did the army take the bomb seriously [22] From an army 
perspective, there is some fear that the budget for conventional weapons would 
be cut to supplant a nuclear weapon and its delivery systems Army officers
18
have also raised the problem of control Not only are they concerned that 
another service might assume the responsibility for nuclear weapons, but this 
would further strain inter-service cooperation
While one can find critics of an Indian nuclear weapon in the military, 
most officers subscribe to the "option" strategy, and there has been a movement 
towards rather than away from nuclear acquisition The military, after wishing 
that the issue would go away, have positioned themselves so that while they 
cannot be accused of pressuring the government to go nuclear, they will be the 
first to stake a claim for control over nuclear weapons once the decision is 
reached [23]
To summarize, the Indian military has undergone a complete transformation 
from being an imperial auxiliary, lacking any significant modern weapons, to 
something approximating a balanced military force possessing nearly all modern 
arms It has grown from a hundred thousand to a million men yet it retains both 
its professional competence and its distance from an active political role It 
would seem, however, that the key to the latter is not to be found in the 
former during the same period the Pakistan army also evolved into a modern 
fighting force while simultaneously placing itself at the center of Pakistani 
politics This suggests that we shift our focus from the military's own 
institutions and experiences to the institutional and social means by which this 
large and powerful machine is guided
19
IV The Armed Forces and the Policy Process
The Indian armed forces play a remarkably small role in the shaping of 
security and defense-related policies, and virtually no role m  the shaping of 
policies outside this area Indeed, probably no military of equivalent 
importance or size has less influence This situation was not inherited from the 
British, but was assembled, piece by piece, over the years, and is now enshrined 
in various constitutional and bureaucratic structures We will examine these 
below, and then discuss vulnerable points in Section V
Formal Structures
As India achieved independence in 1947, a number of structural and 
constitutional arrangements were instituted, which had the net effect of 
ensuring that decisive military power would remain in the hands of the Union 
government, and that within that government the armed forces would be strictly 
subordinate to civilian political and administrative control [24]
The initial step involved removing the Commander-in-Chief, Indian army, 
from the Governor General's Executive Council, when the interim government was 
formed in September, 1947 He was replaced by a civilian defense member (Sardar 
Baldev Singh) A Defense Member's committee was created, and had the 
commander-in-chief, the defense secretary, and the financial advisor as members 
After August 15, 1947, this was transformed into the Defense Minister's 
Committee, and the heads of the air force and the navy joined it The army 
C-m-C then became theoretically equal to the heads of the other, much smaller 
and weaker services (In 1955 the heads of all three services were renamed as 
chiefs of their respective staffs, further reducing their status)
20
The Indian Constitution of 1950 vests the "supreme command of the defense 
forces of the union" m  the President of India, but the President is obligated 
to be "regulated by law," and de facto control over the government apparatus was 
vested in the Prime Minister Article 74 (1) of the Constitution states that 
"There shall be a Council of Ministers with the Prime Minister as head to aid 
and advise the President in the exercise of his functions " Conventions, 
established over the years, and later constitutional changes, have ensured that 
"aid and advice" is authoritative, and no President has attempted to exercise 
independent command over the armed forces
Indian defense policy has usually been formulated at the highest level by a 
subcommittee of the cabinet, now the Political Affairs Committee The chiefs of 
staff of the armed services are not members, but may be invited to sit in on its 
meetings They are members of the Defense Minister's Committee, and have their 
own interservice committee, the Chiefs of Staff Committee This committee is 
chaired by the service chief with the longest tenure on the committee, ensuring 
that the dominant service, the army, will not automatically chair this 
committee "Collectively, the Chiefs of Staff Committee is the highest 
professional advisor to the government on defense matters "[25]
While civilian defense officials claim that this complicated system of 
committees ensures authoritative political guidance to the military and sound 
military advice to the politicians,[26] many in the military would disagree 
They have written that because of the increase in the ministerial membership of 
the Cabinet Committee on Political Affairs, the actual participation of the 
service chiefs at the highest level of decision making has become more diffuse, 
and there is a tendency not to invite the service chiefs even when defense 
matters are discussed [27] Instead, the services have been represented by the
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Defense Secretary, further weakening their access to what is, on paper, the 
final decision-making authority on defense matters
Bureaucratic and Political Control
The Indian military are not only legally circumscribed, but have been 
bureaucratically and politically contained by the powerful Ministry of Defense 
The Ministry must approve all service-originated proposals, it determines all 
policy concerning the location and operation of defense industries —  including 
the choice of weapons that will be produced in these industries —  and it is 
responsible for all public information and policy statements pertaining to 
defense and security matters The Ministry of Defense has no operational 
authority, but it also decides what is or is not a "policy" matter, and hence 
fit for ministry or cabinet level review
The civilian officials of the Defense Ministry regard themselves as the 
pivot on which the defense policy process revolves The ministry's class I 
cadre remains quite small, considering their responsibilities and influence 
Generally, the civilians who fill these positions have only the most rudimentary 
military or defense background Since their tenure is only five years, K 
Subrahmanyam notes that for their first two or three years they are still 
acquiring knowledge about an unfamiliar field, they are only in a position to 
contribute to policymaking during the last half of their tenure Few have had 
extensive international experience Typically, they are intensely aware of the 
internal political and social aspects of defense, not the role of defense policy 
as an instrument of foreign policy
These shortcomings of civilian officials, coupled with their enormous veto 
power over what the generals propose, greatly irritates the military One
c_j
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retired officer characterized the civilian defense official as "one who can talk 
about and pronounce judgment upon the knottiest professional problem with 
nonprofessional competence but professional air "[28] For their part, senior 
civilian defense officials have noted the caution and timidity of the military, 
although some have indicated considerable improvement in the quality of senior 
military leaders in the past ten years
Over the years a variety of appointments have been made to the Defense 
portfolio, and these fall into two types The first have been politically weak 
but administratively competent individuals, who have "managed" the military and 
the Ministry of Defense With one exception, Mrs Gandhi's appointments were m  
this category This exception was Bansi Lai, who reportedly abused his
authority and angered the military After returning to power in 1980 Mrs 
Gandhi reverted to her earlier pattern by appointing first R Venkataraman and 
then S B Chawan to the Defense portfolio
Earlier, more activist ministers had been appointed by Nehru (Krishna Menon 
and Y B Chawan) and during the Janata period (Jagjivan Ram) Menon and Ram, 
in particular, involved themselves in recruitment, training, and promotion 
practices with mixed reactions from the armed services Rajiv Gandhi, at first, 
placed a reliable but powerless figure (P V Narasimha Rao) in the Defense 
Ministry, but by mid-1985 had assumed the portfolio himself, and made a trusted 
friend and associate (Arun Singh) Minister of State Defense Production -- 
perhaps the de facto Defense Minister This step was followed by a rush of 
decisions concerning foreign weapons purchases, and the reorganization of the
armed services
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The Chiefs'’ Controversy
The Indian military have accepted, but not enjoyed, their ever-lessening 
influence at the higher levels of the policy process They are faced with a 
dilemma as long as they retain active command over their respective services 
civilian officials are reluctant to increase their influence within the central 
decision making process The Indian chiefs have enormous operational authority, 
especially during wartime, but only advisory power at the center There they 
are treated as formal equals, despite the obviously greater operational 
authority of the army COAS, and kept well away from the ultimate level of 
decision-making
Naturally, the armed services —  especially the army —  would like to 
change this arrangement, and this issue lies at the heart of the long-standing 
debate over the role of the chiefs Should there be a fourth chief, as in the 
U S and U K 7 If so, who should it be9 The sugggestion of a fourth chief goes 
back at least to 1949, and was raised again in the 1960s by General J N 
Chaudhun and more recently (in 1982) by another COAS, General Krishna Rao [29J
The army is the natural advocate of an expanded joint chiefs system along 
the lines of the British Chief of Defense Staff system or the U S Joint Chiefs 
In virtually every Western country (they argue) such a system exists for 
coordinating military operations during wartime, and providing coordinated and 
combined advice to civilians The Indian system has been notorious for the lack 
of both During 1965 and 1971 there was very little inter-service coordination 
(in 1962 the navy and air force were not involved m  the fighting m  any 
significant way) P C Lai, the then Air Marshal, claims that Chaudhuri 
created the problem m  1965 by his unilateral determination of army strategy and
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failure to consult with the other two services, Lai himself determined what the 
IAF strategy targeting would be in 1971, apparently without reference to army 
wishes Other accounts indicate that the successful combined operations against 
Karachi were due more to good luck and fortunate timing than integrated military 
planning
Somewhat disingenuously, the army advocates of a CDS system claim that the 
Chief need not be from the army, but might be an air force or navy man Whoever 
it was would presumably have to leave his own service parochialism behind
The CDS system is strongly opposed by most navy and air force officers and 
a good number of politicians and the civilian bureaucracy The navy and the IAF 
naturally feel that they would never get to hold the chairmanship Further, 
since the Indian military fights on or near its own borders, a CDS system is 
unnecessary since proper coordination could take place within the current system 
—  especially if the army would cooperate
The political arguments against the CDS system are not as openly voiced, 
but m  the current situation are powerful and final First, there is the 
long-standing civilian suspicion of men in uniform, and a deep-seated belief 
(held by Nehru and, apparently, Mrs Gandhi) that the military remain a 
potential trouble spot for Indian democracy Creating a fourth chief would mean 
creating a fourth general, or even an officer of field marshal rank, without 
good cause More to the point, it runs counter to the divide and rule strategy 
employed by Nehru, Shastri, and Indira Gandhi, implemented by the civilian 
bureaucrats, and directed against the armed forces —  in particular, the 
army [30] In India, the navy and the air force present no credible political 
threat, but the army might The present arrangement reduces the army chief to 
no more than equal (and less than equal, when he does not chair the Joint Chiefs
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committee) Would changing this system actually improve the quality of military 
advice (ask those civilians who oppose change) when the military at best are not 
terribly inventive’ Reshuffling the chief's system —  they argue —  would not 
improve military decision making, but it might enhance the political power of 
the military
An additional word is in order on the selection of the chiefs particularly 
the COAS This has two dimensions the failure of a Sikh to become chief of 
the army staff (even though the army's officer corps is about 18/ Sikh), and the 
apparent manipulation of appointments to ensure that the COAS would be an 
officer who was politically acceptable to the government We shall discuss the 
problem of the Sikhs when looking at the Punjab crisis, although it should be 
noted that two Sikhs have been Chiefs of the Air Staff
When considering promotions to the COAS position, the first step is the 
preparation by the Defense Ministry bureaucracy of a statement of qualifications 
and experience of the five regional commanders northern, southern, eastern, 
western and central, plus the vice chief of staff —  all lieutenant generals 
The six constitute a panel from which the COAS is selected by a cabinet 
subcommittee for appointments presided over by the Prime Minister
Until recently, the principle of seniority has been followed in promoting 
the COAS from this group (promotions at earlier levels are made largely by the 
military itself) There had earlier been great controversy when Lieut Gen 
Harbaksh Singh and Lieut Gen P S Bhagat, two outstanding officers, were 
allowed to retire because they barely lacked seniority
The first overt violation of the seniority principle came on June 1, 1975, 
barely a month before the imposition of the Emergency, when Lieut Gen T N 
Raina was made COAS, jumping over at least one other officer with greater
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seniority The second violation occurred in May, 1983, in an even more 
controversial appointment [31] One of India's most brilliant soldiers,
Lieut -Gen S K Sinha, was superseded by Lieut -Gen A S Vaidya, even though 
Smha was Vice-Chief of the Army Staff, and thought to be in line to become the 
new chief Vaidya was thought to have seriously compromised himself with public 
criticism of the ruling CPM government in Tripura and praise for the election 
alliance between Congress (I) and another party He was attacked in the press 
by the CPM party leadership as having given "political statements", and the 
defense public relations service had to issue a statement to the effect that the 
Indian army "continues to remain apolitical in its best tradition "[32] Sinha 
responded to his supersession by turning in his resignation Several newspapers 
reprinted some of his perceptive writings on the problems of civil-military 
relations in India He has since unsuccessfully entered politics and received 
widespread support from a group of journalists and retired officers who regard 
him as one of the best officers ever produced by the Indian Army
These two incidents occurred under Mrs Gandhi, and it is widely believed
that she was responsible for the supersessions Her defenders argued that the
/
principle of seniority was not inviolable, although they had earlier used it to 
justify the retirement of otherwise very well qualified generals These 
episodes fit into the broader pattern of her style of governance, in which 
appointments were made —  and unmade —  as a matter of convenience and later 
justified The practice disturbed the military, and tended to encourage senior 
officers to curry favors from the political leadership, further dividing them 
The generals could accept a system in which promotion was based on a principle 
of merit, or one based upon strict seniority, but a system in which promotions
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are made in order to keep the military divided is likely to have exactly the 
opposite effect in the long run
While the military's formal role in the higher decision-making system has 
declined over the years, there has been a continuation of military influence at 
other levels Under Mrs Gandhi, retired senior officers were appointed as 
governors, headed various defense production and research facilities, and served 
on various public commissions and agencies In some cases active duty officers 
have received non-military appointments to such bodies One recent (1985) Chief 
of the Air Staff, Air Chief Marshal M L Khatre, had been head of the giant 
manufacturing and research complex, Hindustan Aeronautics, Ltd Quite often, 
senior officers are immediately appointed to such choice positions immediately 
upon retirement (Gen K V Krishna Rao was made Governor of the militarily 
sensitive states of Manipur, Nagaland and Tripura in June, 1984)
There is considerable indirect evidence to show that these 
government-controlled appointments are not given to recalcitrant officers, but 
to those who have cooperated with the government during their tenure in the 
military As the social status of the armed forces continues to decline, it 
will be easier for the government to use post-service employment as a reward to 
pliable officers, especially if these officers have no other career or income to 
fall back on
This strategy may be effective in the short run, but it does risk 
embittering those officers who have not "cooperated", and who feel that their 
colleagues have sold out the profession for personal advancement
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V Civil-Military Relations Subordination or Equality9
In a reasonably well developed political system such as India's, with a 
long tradition of civilian dominance over the military, any change in the 
relationship between the two will be incremental, not dramatic Despite this, 
there is a long tradition of alarmist writing about the imminent take-over of 
the military m  India This has been a popular subject for journalists who have 
been predicting the increased intervention of the army for years [33]
Scholarly analyses have usually been more restrained Their picture of a 
large, diverse, sprawling military establishment, divided into three services, 
numerous commands within each service, all directed by political and 
bureaucratic elites fully aware of the need to maintain civilian authority 
legitimacy, and control is essentially accurate [34] Interestingly, even the 
journalists have begun to subscribe to this view, and predictions of military 
take-over have been replaced by relatively balanced analysis The Indian army 
is now held up as an exception to the dismal parade of coup and 
counter-coup [35]
Although I am one of those who have made a strong case for regarding India 
as an exception to the widespread pattern of military intervention, optimism 
about the political role of the Indian military is premature, and a number of 
the barriers to military intervention have been removed or weakened Others 
remain, but the circumstances under which they, too, might crumble are not 
difficult to imagine
Military intervention in politics will in part be a function of the size of 
the state and the development of the political system Large countries are 
difficult to govern from the center, although if regional institutions are
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relatively underdeveloped, even a large country may in some ways be easier to 
steer from the center than small ones Intervention will also be influenced by 
the prevalent form of civilian control whether the military are ruled because 
they are different than civilians or just like them Armies the size and 
complexity of India's do not intervene lightly, but do so because of 
overwhelming organizational pressures and political compulsions Above all, 
they will intervene to protect their own institutional integrity, or to protect 
or restore a political order which in turn shields them, or to remove one which 
they regard as detrimental to national interests
The Indian army is a long way from overt intervention but there have been 
many signals that some of the barriers to intervention —  or increased military 
influence —  have disappeared The most important such barrier —  the 
legitimacy, integrity, and competence of the central political system —  has 
badly eroded in the past fifteen years This erosion includes the decline of 
the Congress party (except as a vehicle for Indira Gandhi's personal rule) and 
the simultaneous failure of opposition parties to demonstrate their ability to 
govern effectively, fairly, and without serious corruption For the 
professional soldier there was not much choice between the capricious Janata 
government and the willful combination of Bansi Lai and Sanjay Gandhi Service 
resentment over political incompetence —  especially when that incompetence 
affects the conduct of war or the readiness of the military to fight a war, runs 
deep Some day it may be the force which propels the military into politics 
Nor are the armed forces, especially the army, passive observers of the 
deterioration and increasing violence and lawlessness of Indian politics They 
have begun to play a direct role in the political system through the rear 
entrance called "aid to the civil power "
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From Aid to the Civil to Military-Civilian Partnership?
One of the central myths of the Indian political system is that the Indian 
military is "apolitical " This is true only insofar as the armed forces do not 
rule India, and the decision-making process is dominated by civilians It is 
also true that the folklore of the mess says that politics and the military 
profession do not mix, and that young officers are taught that the Indian 
military must remain apolitical However, it is not true in the sense that the 
military know nothing about politics, or that they do not act in support of 
political objectives, or that they do not themselves directly govern more and 
more of India
Most officers, especially army commanders, are very well informed about 
domestic politics, let alone broader strategic and foreign policy issues Every 
Indian district is in an area command, and many cities are part of or adjacent 
to cantonments or bases In each of these cases the area commander has, as part 
of his professional duties, a complete knowledge of local politics He will be 
able to recite with precision the factions, interests, and objectives of each 
local political, religious, or other interest group In this he is supported by 
the military's own intelligence services and close liaison with police and 
civilian bureaucracies
This knowledge is important should the military be called upon " m  aid of 
the civil power " After independence it was recognized that "aid to the civil" 
could be damaging to the preparedness of the armed forces The example of 
Pakistan (where the army ultimately intervened in central politics after having 
been repeatedly called out to prop up civilian authority) was also noted These 
two considerations led to the creation of a massive structure of paramilitary
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forces, which were to serve as a buffer between the regular armed forces and the 
rough and tumble of domestic disorder
Despite these paramilitary forces —  and in a few cases because of them —  
the direct intervention of the armed forces in state and local matters has 
steadily increased m  the past few years Most of these interventions have been 
limited, and were quick "in and out" operations In this sense, the military 
have acted in support of the political structure, providing ultimate force m  
situations where political solutions had failed and where the police could not 
cope
The increase in such interventions has been dramatic During 1951-70 the 
army was called in to suppress domestic violence on approximately 476 
occasions [36] By contrast, the figures for the eighteen month period, June 
1979-December, 1980 saw sixty-four instances of army assistance to civil 
authorities A list of typical army interventions is presented in Table 1, 
Table 2 lists disturbances in thee paramilitary and other security forces 
themselves
These data suggest that the police and paramilitary forces within India are 
themselves a security problem for the army The literature on the subject 
indicates deep army concern about the failings of these forces, beginning in 
1973, when the Uttar Pradesh Armed Constabulary took up arms against the 
government in a labor dispute [37] This concern is justified, since the number 
of and size of these paramilitary forces is increasing faster than their 
reliability and efficiency
Table 1 (Cohen)
Indian Army Deployments in Aid-to-Civil, 1973-84
Year Where Deployed Reason Dates
Approximate
Duration
1973 Assam language riots 13 Apr-17 May 1 month
Lucknowi Uttar Pradesh police unrest 21 May-13 Jun 3 weeks
Arunachal Pradesh tribal violence 13-18 Jun 1 week
Imphal, Manipur riots 13-21 Sep 1 week
Na8ik, Maharashtra election violence 23-24 Apr 2 days
1974 Baroda, Gujarat communal unrest 10-14 Jan, 
25-26 Feb
1 week
Ahmedabad, Gujarat food riots 28 Jan-16 Feb 3 weeks
Dhanbad & Ranchi, Bihar communal violence 20 Mar-2 Apr 2 weeks
Palampur, Himachal Pradesh ? 25-26 Apr 2 days
Patna, Bihar student riots 18-26 Mar 1 week
all India national rail strike 7-20 May 3 weeks
West Bengal (4 districts) riots 27 Aug-5 Sep 2 weeks
1975 all Indian port cities docker's strike 9 Jan 1 week9
Delhi communal riots 9 Feb 1 week9
Cooch Behar, West Bengal rural unrest 9-17 Feb 1 week
1976
1977-79
Prime Minister Gandhi decl¿ 
called out in aid-to-civil
No reliable information avi
ires a state of national emergency The Army is not 
niable *
1980 Assam "antiforeigner" stir, 
election violence
Feb continuous
Tripura** tribal violence 7 Jun-14 Nov 6 months
Meghalaya** tribal insurgency "frequently" continuous
Manipur** student/tnbal unrest 17 Apr-17 May 1 month
Nagaland** tribal violence 23-30 Jul & 15 Nov continuous
Uttar Pradesh, Madhya 
Pradesh, Gujarat, Delhi
communal violence 
(Moradabad)
Aug-Sep 2 months
Jammu & Kashmir ? ? ?
Tamil Nadu ? ? ?
Bihar CISF strike 9 Oct 1 week ?
Himachal Pradesh ? ? ?
1981 As 8 am "antiforeigner" stir continuous 1 year
Gujarat antireservation stir 1 Feb-2 May 3 months
Table 1, contd (Cohen)
Year Where Deployed Reason Dates
Approximate
Duration
1982
1983
Assam
Arunachal Pradesh 
Goa
Barodai Gujarat
Kerala
Maharashtra
Mizoram**
Nagaland**
"antiforeigner" stir 
student/tnbal unrest 
communal disturbances 
communal disturbances 
communal disturbances 
Bombay police strike 
election violence 
election violence
continuous 
17 Jul-21 Aug 
2-7 Nov 
28 Oct-5 Nov 
30 Dec-12 Jan 83 
8 Aug-9 Sep 
May & Dec 
7 Oct
1 year
4 weeks
5 days
2 weeks 
4 days
1 month 
4 days7
2 days7
No known Army deployments other than counterinsurgency operations in the north­
eastern states and continuous peacekeeping duties in Assam Army put on alert 
m  Punjab, Chandigarh, and Haryana
1984 Maharashtra (Bombay, 
Bhiwandi, Thane, and 
adjoining suburbs)
communal riots May-June 4 weeks
Punjab, Chandigarh
(limited deployments m  
adjoining areas of 
Uttar Pradesh, Haryana, 
Rajasthan, Delhi, and 
Kashmir)
Sikh terrorist cam­
paign centered m  
Amritsar, Army 
mutinies
5 Jun-present ongoing
Hyderabad, Andhra Pradesh Hmdu-Muslim riots, 
political demon­
strations
9 Sep-present ongoing
*Mimstry of Defence Annual Reports do not mention any Army involvement 
with domestic peacekeeping chores during the Janata years m  power The 
Reports only highlight Army aid-to-civil m  cases of natural disasters
**Regular Army troops are stationed and on alert m  Meghalaya, Manipur, 
Mizoram, Nagaland, and Tripura on a continuous basis The Reports ordinarily 
refer to Army operations m  these states under a separate heading dealing with 
"counterinsurgency operations "
Table 2 (Cohen)
S
Incidents of Unrest Within Peacekeeping Force«» 1978-84
Date Location
Immediate Cause 
of Unrest Resolution
Oct 78 Tamil Nadu CRPF strike, state 
police unwilling 
to move against 
strikers
2 battalions of BSF 
sent m  to crush the 
strike
May 79 Gujarat police strike Army called m  to 
restore order, 
strikers fired on, 
5,000 arrested
Jun-Oct 79 Bhubaneswar, Pun, 
Trivandrum, Cuttack, 
Neemuch, Thumba, 
Cochin, Madras, Port 
Blair, Delhi, Bokaro
wildcat strikes by 
CRPF, CISF, and RPF 
units
Army and BSF dis­
patched to disarm 
strikers, 24 CISF 
strikers and 3 Army 
jawans killed at 
Bokaro, 3 CRPF 
mutineers killed m  
Delhi
Oct 79 Tamil Nadu police strike BSF and CRPF units 
dispatched, 3,000 
policemen detained
Nov 79 Bombay (Maharashtra) abortive police 
strike
BSF and CRPF per­
sonnel quell the • 
Congress-supported j 
strike 1
Oct 80 industrial locations 
m  Bihar and West 
Bengal
CISF strike leads to 
clashes with police
Army dispatched 1 
to disarm CISF ! 
mutineers j
Jan-Feb 81 Gujarat police discredited 
during caste reser­
vation protests
Army sent in to fill 
police vacuum and 
restore order
Aug 82 Bombay (Maharashtra) police strike Army sent m  to I 
restore the peace j
Jun 84 Army barracks m  
Bihar, Maharashtra, 
Tripura, and 
Rajasthan
uncoordinated mutiny 
by over 1,500 Sikh 
conscripts m  the 
aftermath of Army 
actions at the Golden 
Temple of Amritsar
loyal Army units ! 
capture the muti- | 
neers, Army disci- j 
pi m e  restored
i
_____________________ i
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The army's support of political authority in these aid to the civil 
operations has led into actual military rule in more than one state The legal 
basis for enhanced army responsibility varies, but a number of ordinances, 
promulgated under the President's emergency powers, are now in place
—  the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (1956, subsequently amended) whereby the 
union government declares a state or district a "disturbed area " In areas 
where the declaration comes into force, army and paramilitary commanders are 
given authority to arrest suspects, conduct searches, and use lethal force 
without regard to the authority of the District Magistrate (who ordinarily 
supervises aid to the civil operations)
—  the National Security Act (1980) authorizes security forces to arrest and 
detain suspects for up to six months without a warrant Although there are 
provisions for judicial review, the intent of the legislation is to give the 
armed forces a relatively free hand in dealing with agitators, terrorists, and 
rioters Many provisions of this act are identical to those of the Maintenance 
of Internal Security Act (MISA) which was the legal basis for the Emergency of 
1975-77
—  the Essential Services Maintenance Act allows army troops to replace striking 
workers in "vital" industries such as oil production and rail transport The 
industries are effectively taken over by the army pending settlement of the 
dispute Strikers can be subject to arrest under provisions of the National 
Security Act
—  the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act (1967) allows the center to ban 
subversive organizations This currently applies to rebellious Sikh 
organizations in the Punjab and several insurgent groups in the northeast
—  the Terrorist Affected Areas (Special Courts) Ordinance (1984) was designed
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to help the army root out Sikh terrorists in the Punjab [38] This provides for 
secret tribunals to try terrorists and is based upon the presumption of guilt —  
the accused must prove himself or herself innocent It also confers special 
powers upon the security forces
This stunning array of legislation and ordinance has given the military and 
paramilitary forces considerable power in many affected areas of Assam, Punjab, 
Kashmir and other states For millions of Indians the effective government has 
been the local area or sub-area commander, in some areas the system was no more 
protective of civil liberties than the recent martial law in Pakistan, where 
civil courts and religious courts function parallel to the martial law system 
and appeals from decisions by the latter have been frequent and successful As 
an informed Pakistani military writer has noted of the 1982-3 situation in 
Assam "Such a state of affairs is certainly not martial law but it may well 
contain all its normal concomitants, such as a suspension of civil liberties, 
imposition of press censorship, search and arrest without warrants and 
enforcement of curfew order in sensitive and badly affected areas " By itself, 
such involvement may be necessary and desirable, but the same commentator notes 
that "the military's repeated deployment in situations of extreme civil disorder 
could, on the one hand, induce the civil authority to lean more and more upon 
it, and, on the other, give the military establishment the sugary foretaste of 
power," as it did in both Pakistan and Bangladesh [39]
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Civilian Control From "Objective" to "Sûbjective"7
Samuel Huntington suggests that civilian control over the military 
ultimately takes one of two forms "Objective" control is exercised by a 
legitimate civilian elite which respects and encourages the differences between 
it and the military professionals The latter are devoted to their profession 
and maintain a conservative, restricted ethic By contrast, "subjective" 
control is brought about through the merger of civilian and military values 
the armed forces are controlled because they share dominant civilian values and 
their distinctiveness is blurred
India has been undergoing a transition from objective to subjective control 
for a number of years At first, the gap between civilian and political elites 
was very large, and there were important social and class differences between 
the two However, the military are now recruited from the same social classes 
as the political and administrative leadership, and are in some ways more 
representative of the country Increasingly, the military are called upon to 
assume tasks they would have rejected thirty years ago Further, they are also 
called upon to voice the values and attitudes which are held by politicians —  
they have been asked to become "committed" in the same way that the civil 
service has asked to identify itself with the values and aspirations of Mrs 
Gandhi and the Congress Party [40]
At the same time, some politicians, most notably Mrs Gandhi, have 
encouraged military-like values and attitudes, a form of civilian 
militarism [41] Unlike her father, Mrs Gandhi cultivated the legend of Subhas 
Chandra Bose and the secular, neo-totalitarian, egalitarian, militarism of the
Indian National army
35
Although the comparison may not be exact, some of Mrs 
Gandhi's appeal would seem to be due to the similarities 
rather than the differences between herself and Bose 
She is certainly a secularist and professes faith in 
democracy, although perhaps democracy of a special 
variety Her speeches are dominated by references to the 
need for discipline and order there is no doubt that 
she believes that internal and external enemies require 
continual vigilance, militancy, and preparedness In the 
face of such enemies, even the enemy poverty, civil 
liberties are expendable [42]
This appeal proved to be very popular, and it will be important to see 
whether any other national politician attempts to exploit the theme of 
militancy and militarism It certainly does find resonance in certain 
regions of India, especially those with strong, local, martial traditions 
Similarly, it will be important to see whether the military are again 
called upon to make statements in support of specific political parties 
It only takes a few such statements to have a great impact upon the entire 
military establishment and the political community, for if the military 
give the impression that they have even implicity thrown their support to 
one or another political leader, they will be rapidly cultivated by all 
politicians
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Several astute observers have addressed this development Romesh 
Thapar has observed that India's new breed of officer, drawn from the 
middle classes of the Subcontinent, will invariably come to reflect the 
varied emotions of that Subcontinent, "making politics very much a part of 
the culture of the Indian military establishment, even though the same 
distance still continues to be maintained between it and the 
politicians "[43] He places blame for this on the political community and 
offers several remedies, including the revision of the higher defense 
decision-making process, clipping the power of the "ill-informed IAS 
network," reprofessionalism of the Indian army Otherwise, "India will 
find itself with a million-man army that has lost its professionalism, that 
reflects the worst qualities of Indian life, and that has important 
parochial service interests to protect "
The military literature is replete with nostalgia for an era when the 
army kept to its narrow professional concerns, but I know of no senior 
officer who has resigned his commission on the grounds that the armed 
forces were being asked to undertake inappropriate tasks They have, 
perhaps, decided to bend under pressure As one of India's most literate 
retired officers has written,
Let's face it, whether the civil servant or the soldier 
likes it or not, the political system and its ideologies 
have now become part and parcel of his daily living and 
the environment in which he works Wrongly or rightly, 
they have been allowed to permeate into almost all facets 
of his professional and cultural life, and he can no
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longer pretend to remain outside this system and yet be 
effective as he has managed to do so in the past [The 
services] will have to learn to live with the particular 
ideology and be "committed" to it without appearing to be 
political
Brigadier Grant, who has in the past, advocated an apolitical and neutral 
officer corps sadly concedes that "sympathizers" will do better than 
"neutrals "[44]
If the trend is to continue, then there is reason to be concerned 
about the future professional integrity of the Indian armed forces, 
especially the army There is already a functional differentiation between 
officers who pursue strictly professional goals and those who take 
advantage of the increasing opportunities for corruption Those who seek 
money and corruption can find it —  particularly in the recruiting 
commands, m  the service and supply corps, in the neo-martial law slots in 
the Punjab and elsewhere, and in any position which brings the officer into 
contact with civilian contractors and manufacturers As in Pakistan, part 
of the Indian army may become entangled in a corrupting civilian society 
and part will remain true to its professional ethic
However, increasing corruption within the armed forces is not likely 
to lessen the chances of a future military intervention The example of 
Pakistan[45] indicates that corruption and civilian meddling in internal 
military promotions and policies can be a contributing factor in the 
decision to intervene Indeed, the young Pakistani officer is taught, as 
is his Indian counterpart, that intervention is undesirable, and that the
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military cannot effectively run the country without ruining itself, that 
their country is too large and too complex to be run from the center, and 
that military rule runs against the historic traditions of the armed 
forces All this turns out to be irrelevant when the military face a 
situation of domestic political breakdown which ultimately (and sometimes, 
quite rapidly) affects the integrity of the military For, above all, 
soldiers in both countries are taught that while they are the first line of 
defense against external enemies, they are also the last barrier to 
internal disarray When the politicians, the bureaucrats, the police and 
the paramilitary have crumbled, only the armed forces stand between 
national integrity and national dissolution Therefore, they tend to 
regard any incident which affects their own internal integrity as of 
transcendental importance Pakistan underwent such an experience as a 
consequence of several ill-fated aid to the civil power operations m  
Bengal and Punjab in the 1950s These convinced the military not only of 
their own supreme importance but of the threat to their integrity from 
civilian incompetence We now turn to the tragic, but comparable events in 
the Punjab in 1984, which may turn out to be equal in their importance
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VI The Sikh/Punjab Crisis and the Army
No single event in modern Indian history has so affected the armed 
forces as the Sikh/Punjab crisis of 1983-4 While the 1962 loss to China 
was humiliating, and revealed serious internal military problems, it led to 
a purge of incompetents and a major rebuilding effort The army was 
stronger after the war than before it The events of 1984 were quite 
different The integrity of the armed forces was shaken at every level 
and affected all three services, the crisis also affects the strategic 
assumptions upon which the armed forces have based their war plan
Sikhs and the Indian Military
Sikhs have been a major component of the Indian army for over 130 
years, or about five generations They constituted about 257 of the Indian 
army during World War II, and have always been regarded as among the most 
effective of the army's classes In the army they comprise two separate 
regiments One is the Sikh Regiment, largely make up of Jats, the other is 
the Sikh Light Infantry, made up of Mazbhis and Ramdasias —  scheduled 
castes One of Mrs Gandhi's assassins, Beant Singh, was reportedly a 
Mazbhi Sikh who had been discharged from the army [46] Sikhs are also 
found in several other infantry regiments which recruit on a mixed basis 
They are present in large numbers in the Army Service Corps, the engineers, 
artillery, armor, and other specialized branches They are also found in 
large numbers in the Air Force (perhaps a quarter of the IAF pilots are 
Sikhs), and there are substantial numbers in the Indian Navy [47]
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After independence it was decided to freeze the number of "pure" one 
class regiments in the Indian army, but this did not substantially limit 
Sikh enrollment, which may have been about 207 of the other ranks, and 
perhaps a somewhat greater number of officers However, because of a 
policy established in 1953, and further modified in 1963 by the Military 
Affairs committee of the cabinet (which stated that no state would have a 
dominant position in recruitment), there began a concerted effort to make 
the army more representative and to recruit from those states which had not 
traditionally provided many soldiers (Tamil Nadu, Bihar, Gujerat, Andhra 
Pradesh, among others) [48] In 1974 the Punjab was still providing over 
15/ of the army, it was assigned a quota (2-6/) commensurate with its 
population This figure includes Hindus
The recruitment issue was taken up by Sikh politicians, and comprised 
one of the demands of the Akali Dal's Anandpur Sahib Resolution in 1973 
When the current President of India, Giani Zail Singh, was Chief Minister 
of Punjab (1972-77) he raised the issue of Sikh recruitment with Mrs 
Gandhi (then Prime Minister) and the Union Defense Minister (Jagjivan Ram) 
The Akalis and other Sikh politicians demanded that fitness and merit be 
the sole criteria for recruitment to the armed forces, retired Sikh 
officers have complained that in order to exclude Sikhs, recruiting 
officers follow a discriminatory policy towards qualified Sikh candidates 
By 1981 the Punjab was still sending four times its population 
percentage to the army, which led the then army chief, 0 P Malhotra, to 
remark that "I don't think that people of these states [referring to Punjab 
and Harayana, another traditional recruiting ground] have any reason to be 
dissatisfied "[49] By this time the overall percentage of "traditional",
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i e previously recruited classes, had dropped to 40%, and "all classes" 
comprised 60% of the army The actual figures are not available [50] It 
is not clear where Gurkhas are counted, although their numbers —  even 
though they are not Indian citizens —  have increased since the new policy 
went into effect
Other regions of India have had exactly the same kind of controversy 
over "reservations" The Sikhs, like high caste Hindus, resent the effort 
to increase scheduled caste and backward caste representation in government 
services However, they differ from these groups in that angry Sikhs have 
the skills and resources to effectively resist government policy with 
violence, and they have a religious sanction for their claim to a major 
role in the armed forces
The issue of derecruitment is very important for practical and 
ideological reasons There must be well over 500,000 retired Sikh soldiers 
living in the Punjab, most of whom would like to place at least one male 
relative in the army, navy, or air force
Further, Sikhs regard the newly recruited classes as inferior As an 
old Sikh recruiting handbook stated, all Sikh traditions are ultimately 
martial traditions, and the Sikh community is reluctant to yield their 
special claim to "martial" status [51] They find the norms of a secular 
democracy, where all groups are now regarded as "martial,"[52] to be naive 
and misguided
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Resentment and Mutiny
There is a long history of resentment among Sikhs in the armed forces 
—  especially the army No Sikh has ever become chief of the army staff, 
despite the great over-representation of Sikhs in the senior ranks of the 
army In 1962 six of the Indian army's lieutenant-generals were Sikhs (two 
of them were to die in a 1963 air crash) Out of 28 major-generals 
thirteen were Sikhs, and of seventy-nine brigadiers, there were thirty 
Sikhs [53] Sikhs failed to reach the position of COAS in 1969 and 1974 
when non-Sikh generals received extensions in their term of service There 
is a belief that other groups within the officer corps do not treat Sikh 
officers with proper respect For the most part, however, Sikh soldiers 
have had a brilliant reputation and had no incentive or inclination to 
support terrorist, separatist, or other extreme dissident Sikh groups 
Indeed, they had been deeply involved in the many anti-terrorist and 
counter-insurgency operations undertaken by the Indian army, especially in 
the northeast
Ironically, it was the anti-terrorist efforts intended to cope with 
disturbances at the Asian Games that precipitated active dissent among 
retired Sikh officers Many of them were harassed en route to New Delhi 
and several then proceeded directly to the Punjab, offering their services 
to the Akali agitation Maj -Gen Jaswant Singh Bhullar has been quoted as 
on this episode
We had gone to Delhi and I found that in spite of the fact 
that we showed them my identity card, we were taken out of the 
bus at about nine places in Harayana I told them I was a
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retired army officer but they did not listen and were very 
rude and abusive I felt very humiliated I have taken part 
in practically every war and been wounded twice It was very 
upsetting to think that I had to prove my patriotism in this 
country and to think I needed a passport or some document in 
order to be able to go to Delhi [54]
Worse was to come
Several thousand Sikh ex-servicemen met in a convention at Amritsar on 
January 23, 1983 Among them were five retired major generals and other 
retired officer of general rank sent their messages of support The 
convention provided the leadership for a Volunteer force which the Akalis 
began to organize in March-April, 1983 Several senior retired officers 
joined Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale and helped train his followers [55] One, 
Maj -Gen Shubeg Singh, had earlier organized the Mukhti Bahini and was a 
recognized expert in insurgency warfare
By the time Operation Bluestar was launched, most Sikh units had been 
moved out of the Punjab They were not informed of the advance on the 
Golden Temple, and about two thousand Sikhs in a variety of training and 
active field units mutinied While the government attempted to minimize 
the seriousness of the mutinies, it is known that they included the Sikh 
Regimental Center, units guarding Santa Cruz airport in Bombay, and combat 
units in Rajasthan Jawans and officers from these units may have fled to 
Pakistan
Many Indians were surprised at the Sikh mutiny, but they should not 
have been All Indian army regiments bind their members with a religious
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as well as a civil oath, a practice which the British merely carried over 
from earlier Hindu, Sikh, and Muslim armies Sikh soldiers are accompanied 
into battle by unit priests and the Granth Sahib The perceived 
desecration of their religion signalled a call to arms because of their 
oath, not m  contradiction to it
The situation in the Punjab in 1984-85 was grave from both the Sikh 
perspective and the army's Sikhs, including at least 300,000 retired 
service personnel and their families, were subject to even harsher laws and 
regulations than those enforced in Nagaland, Mizoram, and elsewhere [56] 
Some of the Sikh community have undergone a revolutionary alteration in 
their self-image, from a "we" which included Hindus, in opposition to 
Pakistan, to a "we" which excludes Hindus and has rediscovered the many 
common elements between Sikhism and Islam [57] This is truly the stuff out 
of which new nations are made, and the Khalistan movement received support 
from Sikhs within India as well as outside it This was support offered by 
default Conversations with retired Sikh officers indicate a realistic 
appraisal of the weaknesses inherent in "Khalistan," but a fatalistic 
willingness to support the cause in the absence of what they regarded as 
fair terms from the government of India [58]
As for the Indian army, their occupation of the Punjab is 
unprecedented and dangerous There was no possible military solution to 
the Punjab situation Yet, the army was called upon to supervise the most 
intimate and detailed aspects of life m  the state This further 
embittered the Sikh population in the Punjab, and caused the army to regard 
all Sikhs —  including those in the armed forces —  as potential 
terrorists No "aid to the civil power" doctrine can provide effective
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guidelines for such a situation [59] No wonder that the army has welcomed 
the Punjab's gradual return to normalcy via the political process
Strategic Considerations
One complicating feature of the Punjab crisis has been its strategic 
location From India's perspective, there are important objectives in 
Pakistan's Punjab, although new strategic plans seem to indicate a thrust 
in Rajasthan and Kashmir, rather than Punjab However, the major road and 
rail routes to Kashmir run north through Punjab, and important canals run 
south to Rajasthan, the army needs the active cooperation of all Punjabis 
to fight a major war with Pakistan In 1965 and 1971 that cooperation was 
freely and generously offered by Sikh farmers, transport owners, and 
merchants In 1984-85 the Indian army could not trust the local 
population The army and the various paramilitary units in the Punjab had 
to cope with numerous acts of sabotage, despite an extended curfew In the 
event of a crisis with Pakistan or in Kashmir, such sabotage would severely 
hamper the movement of troops, supplies and food
Finally, the Punjab crisis had one unprecedented impact upon the 
Indian armed forces Given the evidence of the mutinies that occurred in 
June, 1984, the temporary alienation of retired Sikh officers, and the 
close links between Sikhs in and out of the military, assume that no Sikh 
unit was fully trusted, especially in a situation which involved in the 
Punjab itself The government made unprecedented statements about the 
attempts to "spread disaffection in the ranks of the armed forces" —  the 
situation may have been worse [60] The overall integrity of the Indian 
armed forces, especially the army, may have been badly if temporarily
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weakened If Sikhs comprise about 127 of the army, then the effective 
fighting strength of the army was probably reduced by at least that figure 
(more, if non-Sikh units must be deployed so as to contain another 
mutiny) [61]
This decline in the efficiency and reliability of the Indian armed 
forces in 1984-85 was probably greater than the increase in the 
capabilities of Pakistan's armed forces since 1982, the two combined do not 
add up to a shift in the strategic balance between India and Pakistan, but 
it must reduce Indian dominance to mere superiority This poses no 
immediate threat to India since the present Pakistani leadership is not 
likely to engage in any strategic adventurism, but a further decline in 
relative Indian capabilities would create new temptations and new problems 
A different Pakistani leadership might meddle in Kashmiri or Punjabi 
politics, safe m  the knowledge that India had lost its capacity for 
escalation dominance, conversely, an insecure India might turn to nuclear 
weapons to make up for its relative decline in conventional capabilities, 
finally, a worsening of the Punjab crisis could lead to open guerilla 
warfare in that state, widespread sabotage, and the breakdown in the 
integrity of the Indian armed forces if their critical Sikh component
should be removed
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VII Conclusion
The Indian armed forces are under strict constitutional constraints 
and play a very limited role in the central decision making process, 
although they have somewhat more operational authority than many of their 
foreign counterparts Because of India's insecure regional environment, 
they must devote a great deal of time to preparation and planning for war 
(this would seem obvious, but most armies in Latin America and Africa will 
never have to fight) The Indian armed forces are sending more and more 
trained individuals into civilian society every year, and their role in the 
vast military production industry is also growing The domestic 
law-and-order role of the army has dramatically increased in recent years, 
and there is also a new trend for civilian politicians to praise some of 
the military virtues while asking the armed forces to commit themselves to 
specific social and ideological goals
None of this adds up to a dramatic change in the historically limited 
political role of the Indian armed forces There will be no coup in India, 
there is no chance of a "colonels" or "brigadiers" conspiracy to seize 
power, although there are some angry and many disillusioned officers, 
especially among the Sikhs There may be further terrorism, but the 
structure of the Indian civil-military system is fundamentally sound, and 
for most Indians —  the legitimacy of the political system remains high 
Our frequent allusions to Pakistan have indicated that under certain 
circumstances a professional army committed to democratic politics can 
intervene to reform the system, and many Indian observers are properly 
concerned that India might now be where Pakistan was in the mid-50s [62]
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However, the military in Pakistan have acted to protect not only their 
interests but Punjabi interests, whereas no single ethnic group dominates 
the Indian armed forces Further, Pakistan was in a more precarious 
strategic situation than India, and its generals had developed direct 
foreign ties to military suppliers which enhanced their authority 
Finally, the Pakistani political system never put down as deep roots as 
India's, and the Pakistan army could govern more effectively than 
civilians The Indian armed forces have no such foreign ties and they 
openly dismiss the idea of seizing power and governing India's more complex 
and sprawling political system
In sum, from the perspective of sustaining India's democracy, the 
Indian armed forces have made a major positive contribution as they have 
carried out their duties with competent professionalism, and they have made 
a negative contribution in that they have not sought power —  or even 
influence This historic achievement is not to be taken lightly and 
certainly deserves more attention and study However, we have identified a 
number of vulnerable points in the Indian system We conclude this chapter 
by noting these, and how they might lead to a change m  the relationship 
between India's democracy and its armed forces
A New Constitution?
The constitutionally—determined role of the Indian armed forces is 
quite narrow and specific The President remains the commander-in-chief 
while policy direction is provided by the prime minister One of the 
strengths of the present constitutional arrangement is that it provides 
some check on a prime minister tempted to politicize the military
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However, there are frequent discussions of a change in this structure, 
moving towards elements of a French or American system in which the 
presidency becomes a more "political" office In such a system the 
military would find it even harder to resist efforts to politicize them, 
and to conform to a particular political or social ideology Any 
significant alteration m  the Indian Constitution in this direction appears 
now to be unlikely, but if it were to occur, it would be in response to a 
sense of peripheral decay and central weakness in India's federal 
structure
Somewhat more likely is a gradual, even informal, modification of the 
Indian federal balance with the military and paramilitary forces as pawns 
in a subtle struggle for power This process has been underway for some 
time, particularly in those Indian states with non-Congress governments 
They resist the introduction of the regular armed forces or centrally 
controlled paramilitary units, and have instead begun to create their own 
armed militias [63] They have the right to do so in order to maintain law 
and order (a state responsibility), but it has also been argued that this 
right is not absolute, and that the Union government has "overriding" law 
and order responsibilities [64] This controversy contains the seeds of 
intense Union-state conflict, up to and including serious violence, and if 
pressed to that point, further military involvement in the management of an 
Indian state
From Objective to Subjective Civilian Control?
If officers are further encouraged to conform to a dominant political 
and social ideology, and they do, they will compromise their conservative
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institutional perspective on national issues and begin to formulate 
political and social positions of their own While this may suit the 
politicians in the short run, sooner or later it will lead to a divergence 
based on the corporate interests of the officer corps (at the very best), 
or a split in the officer corps, or the movement of the officer corps in 
directions more extreme than those now contemplated by the politicians 
The acceptable price of civilian control is a military with esssentially 
inward looking, conservative views In the past, this ethic was 
strengthened by the class origins of the officer corps, but now such views 
must be inculcated It is tempting to ask the military to serve political
ends —  increasingly as saviors of the law and order situation —  but each 
such request further politicizes the military by bringing them into too 
close contact with civilian society and by placing more and more civilian 
tasks in their hands And, while force is effective in the short run it 
will also fail and the military will then blame their failure on civilians 
A controversy has grown up around the purported success or failure of 
"Operation Bluestar," with the military blaming poor civilian intelligence 
for their own problems in rooting out Bhindranwale and his supporters, the 
military apparently demanded —  and received —  a free hand when they were 
called out in over forty Indian cities to control rioters after Mrs 
Gandhi's assassination, and have been fulsome in praise of their own 
operations as if to show the rest of India that they really could carry out 
a domestic military operation with speed and skill [65] It is true that 
these events are unprecedented and that disasters of this magnitude may 
never reoccur, but the rapid expansion of the army's role after Bluestar
i
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and the assassination suggest that the armed forces were on the edge of a 
new activism
Changes in the Strategic Environment7
Some states, most notably the United States and Great Britain, 
historically limited the role of the army by keeping it small or adopting 
strategies which emphasized the role of the navy India cannot do this as 
it must maintain a large standing army within its own borders in a high 
state of readiness De Tocqueville and other democratic theorists argued 
that democracy and a large standing army were incompatible, but India seems 
to have so far managed both Is this an historical anomaly, and will 
changes in the strategic environment, necessitating changes in the size or 
structure of the armed forces, have an impact on India's democracy7[66]
It is hard to predict the future of India's regional environment, as 
there are new factors which might lead to both greater and lesser conflict 
On the one hand the Soviet Union has occupied Afghanistan, perhaps 
permanently, and there is no indication that they can either win or be 
defeated This has led to increased American interest in South Asia, arms 
for Pakistan, and strains in the Indo-Soviet relationship The military 
are probably more distressed at this turn of events than most civilians, 
and are more attuned to the long-term strategic consequences of the Soviet 
occupation This, and a feeling that civilian strategic incompetence is 
making things worse, might lead to greater military involvement in 
strategic decision-making
Simultaneously, however, there has been a move towards regional 
integration, and possibly arms control, with the rise of SAARC (South Asian
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Association for Regional Cooperation) and expanded bi-lateral 
Indo-Pakistani talks Should these developments move ahead, the Indian 
armed forces might find themselves less important to India's overall 
strategic position, and even asked to engage in a form of regional arms 
control Some generals would not be averse to this, as they would prefer a 
smaller but better equipped military establishment, surplus manpower could 
be absorbed into the paramilitary forces, which in turn could be upgraded
Unlike many other armies, I believe that the Indian armed forces would 
accept a cut in levels as part of a regional peace settlement There is a 
greater risk to Indian democracy from an increase in regional conflict, 
with its concomitant growth in dependency upon the Soviet Union and the 
fueling of the military's appetite for weapons and manpower than a 
step-by-step process of normalization with Pakistan and China
Expansion of the Aid to the Civil Role?
The expansion of the army's law and order function is perhaps the most
dangerous trend of all, from the point of view of military integrity and an
expanding military role in politics The past few years have seen a 
creeping military role, and in the Punjab, Assam, Mizoram, Nagaland,
Manipur and elsewhere "martial law" in all but name The problem has, at 
last, been addressed by the popular media, and there is no question as to 
where the remedies lie [67] The central reform must take place in the
police —  which in turn requires effective political leadership at the
state as well as union level The linkage between the police, criminals, 
and corrupt politicians is potentially fatal to India's democracy it only 
leads to further military intervention This, in turn, is part of the
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problem, not part of the solution, and is a sure road to enhanced military 
involvement in politics India is well below the threshold at which the 
military decides that It should rule if it is going to be asked to do so by 
civilians, but every additional aid to the civil operation brings it that 
much closer With the repeated breakdown of police and paramilitary forces 
in dealing with politically contentious disturbances (such as the 
reservations agitation in Gujerat) the military are now regularly called in 
for flag marches and to maintain essential services They are effective in 
these roles, but it is only a matter of time when (as in Pakistan) they 
become the object of popular hatred And, when the police and paramilitary 
forces are themselves in revolt, the army must contend with armed and 
trained rioters
Decline in Political Legitimacy7
The armed forces operate at the margin of moral behavior, and their 
obedience to civilian authority will continue only as long as that 
authority is regarded as legitimate —  and hence legitimize the behavior of 
the military In a developed political system, such as India's, legitimacy 
is the consequence of effective performance in open and free elections and 
a degree of competence in matters which directly affect the military In 
the case of Nehru and Mrs Gandhi, there was also a direct, even 
charismatic link to the jawans, NCOS and JCOs, over the heads of the 
officers No general could compare his own popularity with that of such 
leaders However, m  the absence of such a charismatic leader, civilian 
legitimacy must be based on the actions of politically effective and 
administratively competent ministers who are able to protect the vital
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interests of the military and the state Civil servants cannot substitute 
for them, as they lack any mandate other than "civilian control," a mantra 
that will not survive genuine military concern
As for the future, it is apparent that the government of Rajiv Gandhi 
is trying to reverse a trend m  which political legitimacy was increasingly 
personalized and thus increasingly vulnerable It is not yet self-evident 
that his government will be able to successfully resolve those foreign and 
domestic problems, most notably the Punjab crisis and relations with 
Pakistan, which are least amenable to charismatic appeal, but which are 
viewed by the military as vital to their own —  and India's —  survival 
However, the efforts made in this direction over a one-year period are more 
than encouraging
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